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CHAPTER 8
Racism, Nationalism and Right-Wing 
Extremism Online : The Austrian 
 Presidential Election 2016 on Facebook
Christian Fuchs
8.1. Introduction
Norbert Hofer was the Freedom Party of Austria’s (FPÖ) candidate in the 2016 
Austrian presidential election. In the first round, he achieved 35.05% of the 
cast votes and became the strongest candidate. The second round took place 
on May 23 and saw a run-off between Hofer and Alexander Van der Bellen. 
Hofer’s share of the vote was 49.64%. Van der Bellen, who was the leader of 
Austria’s Green Party leader from 1997 until 2008, won with a voting share of 
50.35% in the second round and a lead of just a bit more than 30,000 votes. The 
Austrian presidential election received lots of international interest and people 
were asking themselves how it was possible that a far-right candidate achieved 
almost half of the vote. The FPÖ filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court 
of Austria that resulted in a re-run of the run-off.
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This chapter asks: how did voters of Hofer express their support on Face-
book? It applies critical discourse analysis to data collected from postings on 
two public Facebook pages (Norbert Hofer, Heinz-Christian Strache). The 
analysis situates Hofer supporters’ ideological discourse in Austria’s political 
context and history.
Section 2 engages with theoretical foundations by discussing the notion of 
ideology. Section 3 focuses on the theoretical clarification of nationalist and 
new racist ideology. Section 4 provides an overview of the Freedom Party’s ide-
ology. Section 5 explains the methodology. Section 6 presents the analysis and 
interpretation. Section 7 draws some conclusions.
8.2. Theoretical Foundations: What is Ideology?
This work studies online nationalism and online xenophobia. It is a contribu-
tion to empirical ideology critique. An underlying theoretical question that 
arises in this context is how one should best understand the notion of ideol-
ogy. There are different traditions of how to define and study ideology. Ap-
proaches include for example Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, Lukács’ 
theory of reification, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, the Frankfurt School, 
Hallian Cultural Studies, various forms and schools of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, Foucauldian discourse analysis, Althusserian ideology theory, and 
so on (Eagleton 1991, Rehmann 2013, Žižek 1994). These theories do not 
have a consensus on what ideology is and how it should be defined. Two ma-
jor schools in the critical study of ideology go back to Antonio Gramsci and 
Georg Lukács.
Whereas Gramsci’s approach can be characterized as ideology theory, the one 
by Lukács can be seen as ideology critique (Fuchs 2015, chapter 3).  Gramsci 
understands ideology as worldviews, the ‘superstructure of a particular struc-
ture’ (Gramsci 1988, 199) and a ‘conception of the world’ (Gramsci 1988, 343). 
Lukács’ approach, based on Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, sees ideol-
ogy as reified thought emerging in reified societies. He therefore argues that the 
‘emergence and diffusion of ideologies appears as the general characteristic of 
class societies’ (Lukács 1986, 405).
Terry Eagleton (1991, chapter 1) discerns various understandings of ideology 
by identifying six theoretical approaches:
1. Ideology as the ‘production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life’ (28) 
(=ideology as culture);
2. Ideas and beliefs of ‘a specific, socially significant group or class’ (29) 
(=ideology as worldview);
3. The ‘promotion and legitimation of the interests’ of a group ‘in the face of 
opposing interests’ (29);
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4. The ‘promotion and legitimation of sectoral interests’ in the ‘activities 
of a dominant social power’ (29) (=ideology as dominant worldviews);
5. ‘[I]deas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests of a ruling 
group or class specifically by distortion and dissimulation’ (30);
6. ‘[F]alse or deceptive beliefs […] arising not from the interests of a domi-
nant class but from the material structure of society as a whole’ (30).
Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School have especially influenced the theoreti-
cal concept of ideology used in this article and the Marxian theoretical approach 
that underlies it (Fuchs 2015, Fuchs 2016b, 2016c, 2018a). The notion of ideol-
ogy employed relates to Eagleton’s fifth and sixth meanings of ideology. By ideol-
ogy, I understand thoughts, practices, ideas, words, concepts, phrases, sentences, 
texts, belief systems, meanings, representations, artefacts, institutions, systems 
or combinations thereof that represent and justify one group’s or individual’s 
power, domination or exploitation of other groups or individuals by misrepre-
senting, one-dimensionally presenting or distorting reality in symbolic repre-
sentations (Fuchs 2015). Ideology is not simply an abstract structure, but has 
a concrete, lived reality: Ideological workers produce and reproduce ideologies 
(Fuchs 2015, chapter 3). Marx characterizes the producers of ideology as ‘the 
thinkers of the [ruling] class’, its ‘active, conceptive ideologists’, who – based on a 
division of labour within the ruling class – ‘make the formation of the illusions of 
the class about itself their chief source of livelihood’ (Marx and Engels 1845, 68).
The definition taken in the theoretical approach underlying this work implies 
moral realism and socialist praxis: Humans can analyse and understand the 
world’s reality and complex problems’ real causes. Ideology critique is the de-
construction of falsehood, of knowledge that is presented as truth, but is decep-
tive. Socialist moral realism implies that dominative and exploitative societies 
negate humans’ general interests. From a political point of view, they therefore 
should be abolished and replaced by a societal formation that benefits all eco-
nomically, socially, politically and culturally. Such a society of the commons is 
a socialist society. Eagleton’s fifth and sixth meanings of ideology are based on 
a dialectical contradiction of class societies and socialism. These are critical-
political understandings that imply political praxis and the transcendence of 
class, capitalism and domination.
Not everyone agrees with such a definition of ideology. Theories of ideology 
generally disagree. For Louis Althusser (2005), ideology is an ‘organic part of 
every social totality’ (232). ‘Ideology is a system (with its own logic and rig-
our) of representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts, depending on the 
case) endowed with a historical existence and role within a given society’ (231). 
 Althusserian ideology theory has been influential.
Stuart Hall (1986/1996, 26) defines ideology as ‘the mental frameworks – 
the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of 
representations – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to 
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make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works’. 
Hall (1982) identifies the critical paradigm in media studies with the study 
of ideology. The origin would have been the Frankfurt School’s challenge of 
behaviourist media effects research. Hall’s notion of ideology is grounded in 
structural linguistics and the works of Gramsci, Althusser and Laclau.
The problems of Hall’s understanding are twofold. First, humans are denied 
subject positions. Discourse and ideological structures are turned into a sub-
ject. Such structuralism becomes evident when structures are presented as 
actively doing something and humans are seen as structure’s objects. Hall for 
example writes that each person is positioned and languaged (80), ideological 
discourses win their way (80), and discourse speaks itself through him/her (88). 
It is then not humans who communicate ideology and discourse through lan-
guage, but rather it is ideology that languages, speaks, communicates, and so 
on. In this approach, ideology is an articulation of linguistic elements, of rules, 
codes, linguistic systems, classificatory systems, matrixes, and sets of elements. 
Missing is the insight that ideology is an active communicative process and a 
social relation, in which humans, groups and classes produce and reproduce 
power relations. Production and reproduction of power entails possibilities to 
undo, perturb, challenge, and oppose existing power relations just like it entails 
possibilities to take over, justify, sustain, and legitimate such relations.
The second problem is associated with the first: in a structuralist approach, 
social struggle becomes a struggle between ideologies. It is not seen as a power 
relation between humans, in which they actively produce and reproduce dis-
courses and ideologies. It is not ideologies that struggle with each other, but hu-
mans, human groups and classes who struggle against each other with various 
means, including the means of communication, and with specific capacities to 
mobilize power. Such resources in ideological and other struggles have specific 
distributions that enable various degrees of power. Hall’s approach is a relativis-
tic determinism, in which ideological struggles and alternative interpretations 
emerge with necessity. He therefore speaks of ideology as a ‘site of struggle’ 
(between competing definitions) (70) and of significations as ‘controversial and 
conflicting’ (70). There is certainly always the possibility for contestation, but 
no necessity for it. Asymmetric power relations can equip humans, groups and 
classes to different degrees with capacities to speak, communicate, be heard, 
visible and listened to, and to get information across to others.
General understandings of ideology represent the first and second meanings 
identified by Eagleton. The problem is that such a generalist understanding 
is morally and politically relativist. If the views that ‘Jews are inferior beings, 
that women are less rational than men, that fornicators will be condemned to 
perpetual torment’ are ‘not instances of false consciousness, then it is difficult 
to know what is; and those who dismiss the whole notion of false conscious-
ness must be careful not to appear cavalier about the offensiveness of these 
opinions’ (Eagleton 1991, 15). If democratic socialism and anti-fascism are the 
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dominant paradigms in a society, then in such a societal context, fascism, rac-
ism and capitalism are in a general understanding of ideology forms of ideol-
ogy critique. Such a generality is a disservice for a critical theory of society. Max 
Horkheimer (1972, 28) remarks in this respect about Karl Mannheim’s general 
theory of ideology that such general approaches ‘thoroughly purge from the 
ideology concept the remains of its accusatory meaning’. According to Adorno 
(1981, 38), generalising theories of ideology employ ‘the terminology of social 
criticism while removing its sting’. Whereas the critique of ideology is ‘deter-
minate negation in the Hegelian sense, the confrontation of the ideational with 
its realization’ (Adorno 1972, 466), general theories of ideology replace the de-
terminate negation by the analysis of ‘general worldviews’ (Adorno 1972, 472).
Eagleton’s fifth and sixth definition do not imply, as claimed by Stuart Hall 
(1986/1996, 30), ‘economic and class reductionism’. In the theory of false con-
sciousness and false society, class background and position do not determine, 
but condition consciousness. A dominant class is often organized in competing 
class factions that also have competing ideologies. The example of Marx and 
Engels, who came from quite bourgeois families, shows that individuals are 
not trapped in certain ideologies because of their background. Consciousness 
is dynamic and reflects in complex non-linear ways the total of an individual’s 
experiences, social positions and social relations in society.
Also, in the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), there are differ-
ent understandings of ideology. Norman Fairclough (2010, 73) distinguishes 
between critical and descriptive concepts of ideology. Teun van Dijk (1998, 8) 
has a more descriptive approach and defines ideology as a mental framework 
that is ‘the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group’ that 
allows the organisation of the group members’ social beliefs and practices. In 
contrast to van Dijk, Fairclough defines ideology as ‘representations which con-
tribute to the constitution, reproduction, and transformation of social relations 
of power and domination’ (Fairclough 2010, 73). His understanding is close to 
the fourth, fifth and sixth meanings of ideology identified by Eagleton.  Reisigl 
and Wodak (2009, 88) understand ideology as a ‘one-sided perspective or world 
view’ of a particular social group that is a means for ‘establishing and maintain-
ing unequal power relations through discourse’. Wodak explicitly acknowledges 
the influence of Frankfurt School Critical Theory on the discourse-historical 
 approach of CDA (Wodak 2009, 34–35; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 32).
Theodor W. Adorno’s works show ideology critique in action. The domi-
nant tendency is to reduce Adorno to the critique of the culture industry 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 94–136; for a discussion and critique of this 
tendency, see: Fuchs 2016b, chapter 3). Such readings overlook the wealth of 
Adorno’s ideology critique that includes also for example studies of the ideol-
ogy of anti-Semitism (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 137–172), fascist and au-
thoritarian ideology (Adorno 1955, 1973), ideologies in everyday life (Adorno 
1951), astrology, superstition and occultism (Adorno 1955, 1962), ideology and 
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its critique in education (Adorno 1971), and so on. Adorno understands ideol-
ogy in a Lukácsian sense as ‘a consciousness which is objectively necessary and 
yet at the same time false, as the intertwining of truth and falsehood’ (Adorno 
1954, 189). For Adorno (1954, 190), the need for ideology critique follows from 
the existence of ideology. The understanding of ideology underlying this article 
stands in the tradition of Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School. Based on the 
Frankfurt School tradition, Jürgen Ritsert (1972) has defined empirical ideol-
ogy critique as a method of critical social research.
8.3. Nationalism and New Racism
Through ideologies, humans, groups and classes try to persuade, influence, 
reify, hide, distort, promote, legitimate, deceive, misrepresent, or justify domi-
native interests. Karl Marx (1867, section 1.4) saw capitalism’s structure as 
inherently fetishistic: the commodity form hides the social character of capital-
ism behind things. Fetishism is not just an economic phenomenon, but it can 
be found in class societies in peculiar ways in the realms of politics and ideol-
ogy. Ideology tries to naturalize domination by hiding its social and historical 
character and dissimulating attention from the power relations underlying het-
eronomous societies. An example is the construction of an ideology that claims 
that ‘we’ national citizens are all together facing society’s problems (unemploy-
ment, poverty, crime, precariousness, crises, lack of adequate housing, welfare, 
education, health care, and so on), that ‘we’ have these problems because of 
foreign influences, and we can as a nation fight these dark forces. The ideologi-
cal trick in such arguments is to disguise that ‘we’ are not a unitary subject in a 
class society, but we have different positions and capacities in power relations. 
Nationalism is a particular form of ideology.
It was Rosa Luxemburg (1976), who first used Marx’s notion of fetishism as a 
political concept to question the fetishistic character of the nation and nation-
alism. She argues that nationalist ideology ‘ignores completely the fundamental 
theory of modern socialism – the theory of social classes’ (135). Nationalism is 
a ‘misty veil’ that ‘conceals in every case a definite historical content’ (135). ‘In 
a class society, “the nation’” as a homogeneous socio-political entity does not 
exist. Rather, there exist within each nation, classes with antagonistic interests 
and “rights”’ (135). Nationalism is an ideology that in a particular manner veils 
and distracts attention from society’s class relations and the role they play in 
society’s problems.
Some common elements of Marxist theories and understandings of national-
ism are the following ones1 (compare: Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, Hall 1993, 
Hobsbawm 1992, Luxemburg 1976, Özkirimli 2010):
tIdeology: Nationalism is an ideology that constructs an Us/Them difference, 
in which the in-group is conceived as a unitary, homogeneous collective 
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defined either by common claims to biology, genealogy, kinship and family 
(‘race’) or by claims to a common culture (commonality of language, com-
munication, upbringing, moral values, traditions, customs, law, religion, 
emotions, experiences, identity, means of communication), a common state/
political system/constitution or a common economy. Nationalism as ideol-
ogy makes claims to territorial power for organising a national economic 
and a national political system. Nationalism constructs/invents/ fabricates 
the nation and fictive national identity. Nationalist identity stresses fixity 
and homogeneity, whereas in reality all societies are complex, hybrid and 
diverse.
tDialectic of racism/xenophobia and nationalism: Racism/xenophobia and 
nationalism are inherently linked. Xenophobia is an ideological construc-
tion of the out-group that is not part of the illusionary national collective.
tPolitical fetishism: Nationalism, xenophobia and racism are a form of po-
litical fetishism that ideologically distracts from how society’s class antago-
nisms bring about social problems. The distraction from and veiling of class 
are often achieved by the construction of scapegoats and by steering hatred 
against them.
tForms of nationalism: Nationalism, xenophobia and racism can be directed 
against an inner enemy (migrants, minorities) or an outer enemy (other 
nations, foreign groups). One can draw a distinction between sociological 
and institutional racism/nationalism and between inclusive (exploitative) 
and exclusive (exterminatory) racism/nationalism. Furthermore, there are 
biological and cultural forms of racism/nationalism.
tMilitarism: Nationalism is associated with internal militarism (repression 
and law-and-order politics directed against immigrants and minorities) 
and external militarism (imperialist warfare).
Whereas nationalism constitutes an inward-oriented ideology constructing the 
identity of an invented political and cultural collective, racism and xenophobia 
define the outside of this collective, those who are considered not to be part of 
the nation, the nation’s outsiders, foreign elements, or enemies. Racism is ‘a 
supplement internal to nationalism’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 54). ‘Racism 
is constantly emerging out of nationalism […] And nationalism emerges out 
of racism’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 53). Classical nationalism often con-
structed the outsider in biological terms as a ‘race’, whereas today it has become 
more common to define the outsider in cultural and political terms. Whereas 
some observers therefore like to distinguish between racism and xenophobia, 
Étienne Balibar has coined the notion of the new racism to describe ideological 
continuities and parallels:
The new racism is a racism of the era of ‘decolonization’ […] [It] fits 
into the framework of ‘racism without races’ […] It is a racism whose 
dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of 
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cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the 
superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ 
the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles 
and traditions; in short, it is what P. A. Taguieff has rightly called a dif-
ferentialist racism. (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 21)
Pierre-André Taguieff, to whom Balibar refers, argues that racism is ideologi-
cally naturalising differences, ‘either by scientistic biologization or by ethniciza-
tion or “culturalist” fixing’ (Taguieff 2001, 200). He distinguishes between two 
basic types of racism. Racism type 1 biologizes differences and argues that one 
postulated ‘race’ is superior to another and that such differences are natural 
and eternal. Racism type 2 culturalizes and celebrates differences. It concludes 
that specific cultures should therefore not mix. ‘Naturalization is therefore ei-
ther biologizing or culturalist’ (207). Both versions draw comparable political 
conclusions that include the erection and defence closure of borders, ending 
migration, and the opposition to multiculturalism: ‘Irreducible, incomparable, 
and unassimilable, the human types that differ (the reasons for difference are 
infinite), moreover, may not communicate with each other, neither de facto 
nor de jure. The impossibility of a human community beyond the enclosures 
is the ultimate conclusion of the thesis of incommunicability. Hence the violent 
denunciations of ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘globalism,’ processes and ideals that are 
supposed to destroy singular and closed communities, and, more profoundly 
and less distinctly, their ‘identity’’’. (204). Taguieff ’s key insight, on which Bali-
bar builds, is that there are biologistic and culturalist versions of racism.
Banks and Gingrich (2006, 2) use the term neo-nationalism for the ‘re- 
emergence of nationalism under different global and transnational conditions’. 
Parliamentary neo-nationalists in Europe tend to be opposed to immigration 
and the EU and to argue for differentialist racism. They embrace strong leader-
ship and cultural populism. Much – 
neo-nationalist rhetoric is sufficiently pragmatic to accept that blood-
based homogeneity can never define the boundaries of the national, let 
alone the state, and seeks instead to generate an argument based upon 
historical association […] ‘cultural fundamentalism’ […] has often 
come to replace race in the discourse of neo-nationalists. […] [Neo-
nationalism is] an essentialist and seclusive reaction against the current 
phase of globalization […] [that] primarily relates to ‘culture.’ (Banks 
and Gingrich 2006, 9, 15, 17)
Ajanovic, Mayer and Sauer (2015, 2016)’s analysis of right-wing extremist 
discourses in Austria confirms the existence of a neo-racism that takes on a 
cultural form. In Austria such ideological discourses tend to have a strong anti-
Muslim orientation. A negative difference between Austrians and Muslims is 
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proclaimed. Muslims and immigrants are said to cause social problems and 
cultural decline. The authors document ideological arguments for keeping so-
cial spaces (schools, religious space, public space, kindergartens, transporta-
tion, work places, local spaces, and so on) free from what is perceived as foreign 
influence. Political ethno-pluralism is the political conclusion drawn from such 
discourses: The implication of this ideology is Austria should close its borders 
for migrants, oppose a multicultural society, and that, if any at all, only assimi-
lated migrants are acceptable.
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that racism and sexism are necessary elements 
of capitalism. Racism and xenophobia are strategies in capitalism to ‘mini-
mize the costs of production’ and to ‘minimize the costs of political disruption 
(hence minimize – not eliminate, because one cannot eliminate – the protests 
of the labour force)’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 33). Sexism invents house-
workers and asserts they are ‘not ‘working’, merely ‘keeping house’ (35). House-
work is not just reproduced labour-power, but is also an ‘indirect subsidy to 
the employers of the wage labourers in these households’ (34). The connection 
of sexism and (new) racism in capitalism is that they are both anti-universalist 
ideologies that legitimate low- and no-wage labour and discrimination.
Given the concepts of ideology and nationalist ideology, we can next have a 
short look at how the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) has made and advanced 
a particular form of Austrian nationalism that has turned it – measured in elec-
tion results – into Europe’s most successful far-right parliamentary party.
8.4. The Freedom Party of Austria’s History and Ideology
The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) emerged 
in 1955 from the Association of the Independents (Verband der Unabhängi-
gen) that was founded in 1949 and was the home of many former Austrian 
members of the Nazi Party. Until 1986, the FPÖ had both a liberal and a 
 German-nationalist wing. In 1983, the FPÖ under the liberal leadership of 
Norbert Steger entered a coalition government with the Social Democrats. In 
1986, Jörg Haider became the FPÖ’s new leader. The Social Democrats ended 
the coalition government because they saw the rise of Haider as a shift of the 
FPÖ towards the far-right. In 1991, Haider praised Hitler’s employment policy 
by saying: ‘In the Third Reich, they carried out an orderly employment pol-
icy, which is not even accomplished by your government in Vienna’.2 Haider 
ignored the fact that Hitler’s employment offensive was part of Germany’s 
armament and his plan of starting the Second World War. ‘This respectable 
occupation of people, which is described here in such positive terms, served, as 
we all know, to prepare for a war of extermination’ (Wodak 2002, 40). Brigitte 
Bailer-Galanda and Wolfgang Neugebauer (1997, 102) write that the ‘FPÖ rep-
resents a successful new adaptation of old right-wing extremism’.
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Under Haider’s right-wing populist leadership, the FPÖ continuously ex-
tended its voting share in national elections. Haider used election slogans such 
as „Stop der Überfremdung!” (Stop the overforeignisation!). In 1993, he started 
the anti-immigration-referendum „Österreich zuerst!” (Austria first!). The ref-
erendum that called for completely stopping immigration and creating the con-
stitutional provision that ‘Austria is not an immigration country’ was signed 
by 7.35% of the electorate. In 1999, the FPÖ reached 26.91% in the federal 
elections, became the second strongest party, and formed a coalition govern-
ment together with the Conservative Party ÖVP. This right-wing coalition was 
in power from February 2000 until April 2005. It was isolated in the European 
Union. The FPÖ split into two parties, which weakened both temporarily.
In 2008, Jörg Haider died in a car accident. Heinz-Christian Strache became 
the Austrian far-right’s new leader. He has been the FPÖ’s leader since 2005. 
Strache used campaign slogans such as „Daham statt Islam. WIR für EUCH” 
(‘Homeland instead of Islam: WE are for YOU’), „Wien darf nicht Istanbul 
werden” (‘Vienna must not turn into Istanbul’), „Mehr Mut für unser‚ 'Wiener 
Blut: Zu viel Fremdes tut niemandem gut” (‘More courage for our ‘Viennese 
Blood’: Too much foreignness is not good for anyone’ ). In the Austrian fed-
eral elections 2013, the FPÖ reached 20.51% of the votes. In national opinion 
polls on electoral preference, the FPÖ has since 2014 continuously achieved the 
highest share of potential votes (up to 35%) and has significantly stayed ahead 
of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) (data source: neuwal.com). 
Michał Krzyżanowski (2013) argues that the FPÖ has undergone an ideologi-
cal transition, from a focus on general opposition to immigration under Jörg 
Haider in the years 1986–2005, towards Islamophobia since 2005.
Austria is one of the European countries hit much less by the 2008 economic 
crisis than others. So, for example, its unemployment rate stayed relatively con-
stantly around 5% in the years 2008–2015, whereas in Greece it increased from 
7.8% in 2008 to 24.9% in 2015 (data source: Eurostat). In Spain, the increase 
was from 11.3% to 22.1% (data source: Eurostat). Nonetheless one can observe 
a very significant increase of the far-right’s support in Austria, which shows 
that we cannot simply assume supporters of the far-right are the losers of mod-
ernisation, crisis and globalization; they project their fears of potential future 
social decline onto foreigners and minorities. Neo-nationalist and new racist 
campaigns often ‘address and instrumentalize concerns and fears about down-
ward social mobility’ (Gingrich 2006, 47). Heribert Schiedel (2007, 49–50, 59) 
argues in this context that crises can condition fears of social downfall and that 
in such situations it is crucial whether citizens find meaningful alternatives to 
right-wing populism. It is an important factor in such situations, to what de-
gree right-wing populists try to create chauvinist, xenophobic, racist and anti-
Semitic fear so that citizens are encouraged to project their aggressions into 
surrogate objects.
Norbert Hofer was a co-author of the 2011 FPÖ’s party programme that de-
fines Austria as being culturally German:
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We are committed to our homeland of Austria as part of the German-
speaking linguistic and cultural community, to the groups of people 
native to our country and to a Europe of free peoples and fatherlands. 
[…] The language, history and culture of Austria are German. The vast 
majority of Austrians are part of the German peoples’, linguistic and 
cultural community. […] Austria is not a country of immigration. (FPÖ 
2011)
The FPÖ defines the nation based on language, history and culture. It claims 
that Austrians are part of the German cultural nation and that nations must be 
kept separate, which is why it opposes multiculturalism. It misses that Austria 
has been a multicultural society for a long time – since the time of the Austrian 
empire. To define Austria as exclusively German was the project of the Nazis 
during the time of Hitler.
The Austrian president has a symbolic role. The major power lies with the 
government. Hofer in his electoral campaign announced that as Austrian presi-
dent he would change this division of power and act not just symbolically; he 
would dismiss the government if it did not accord to his prospects, for example 
in respect to refugee and immigration policies. ‘I have said that I dismiss the 
government if it breaks laws, breaks the constitution or again and again takes 
measures that harm the country. And then, the last step, the ultimo ratio, in 
order to avert damage from the country, can be the government’s dissolution’3 
(ATV, 15 May 2016). Green Party candidate Van der Bellen commented:
This would mean that the government acts by order of the President. 
But it is exactly the other way round: The President has to respect the 
government’s suggestions. If you are elected and you really pursue this 
style, then we are on the way into an authoritarian republic4. (ATV, May 
15, 2016)
Who votes for the FPÖ? In the Austrian federal elections 2013, where the 
FPÖ achieved 20.5% of the vote, it was the strongest party among men (28%), 
blue-collar workers (33%), those aged 16–29 (22%), and those whose highest 
educational attainment is a polytechnic school (35%) – a one-year practical 
education that prepares pupils at the age of 14 for starting an apprenticeship 
(SORA 2013). The typical FPÖ voter is a young, male blue-collar worker with 
a low level of education (Pelinka 2002). In 2014, the EU-wide average share 
of those who were aged 25 or above and held at least a bachelor’s degree, was 
22.3% (data source: UNESCO Statistics). Austria had with 12.25% the lowest 
share of all 22 EU countries for which data is available (data source: UNESCO 
Statistics).
Also, in the 2016 presidential election, such divisions of the social structure 
of voters became evident: in the second round, 60% of the male voters cast 
their ballot for Hofer, but only 40% of the women did the same. 86% of the 
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blue-collar workers supported Hofer, whereas 60% of the white-collar workers 
voted for the Green party candidate Alexander Van der Bellen. Of those who 
only completed compulsory education 55% cast their vote for Hofer. The same 
can be said for about 67% of those who completed apprenticeships and about 
58% of those whose highest educational attainment was the completion of a vo-
cational school (berufsbildende mittlere Schule, BMS). In contrast, 73% of those 
who had passed school leaving examinations (Matura) and 81% of the univer-
sity-educated voters opted for Van der Bellen (source of all data: SORA 2016). 
Class and education are key factors influencing voting behaviour in Austria.
I will next discuss the methodology of the empirical research conducted for 
this study.
8.5. Methodology
Netvizz is a software tool that facilitates the extraction of data from Facebook 
groups and pages. I used Netvizz in order to collect comments on postings 
related to Hofer’s presidential candidacy. I accessed Norbert Hofer and Heinz 
Christian Strache’s Facebook pages on 30 May 2016, and I used Netvizz to ex-
tract comments to postings made between 25 and 30 May. Given that the col-
lected comments were posted in the days after the presidential election’s second 
round, it is likely that the dataset contains data referring to the political dif-
ferences between Hofer and Van der Bellen. I selected postings by Hofer and 
Strache that were particularly polarising. This selection resulted in a total of 
15 postings: 10 by Strache, 5 by Hofer. There were a total of 6,755 comments 
posted as responses to these 15 Facebook postings, so the analysed dataset con-
sisted of 6,755 items.
I conducted a critical discourse analysis of the dataset. First, I identified dis-
course topics. Discourses are semantic structures that consist of certain topics. 
A discourse topic is a semantic macro-proposition (van Dijk 1987, 48–50) or an 
interpretative repertoire that is a bounded linguistic building block for actions 
and their representations (Potter and Wetherell 1988, 172). Second, I searched 
for typical examples of these discourse topics that were included in further anal-
ysis. Third, I looked at how the comments constructed an Us/Them-distinction. 
This included an analysis of how ‘We’ and ‘They’ were characterized. In critical 
discourse analysis such characterisations are called nominations and predica-
tions. These are discursive strategies for characterising persons or phenomena 
in specific ways (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 44–56). Predication is the ‘discursive 
qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events/processes and actions’ 
as ‘more or less positively or negatively’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 94). I tried to 
identify ideological strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-
presentation that were used for constructing a collective identity.
Teun van Dijk’s (2011) ideological square-model is based on the assumption 
that there are four common ideological argumentation strategies:
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– To emphasize positive things about Us (=the in-group).
– To emphasize negative things about Them (=the out-group).
– To de-emphasize negative things about Us.
– To de-emphasize positive things about Them.
‘The complex meta-strategy of the ideological square tells us that group mem-
bers will tend to speak or write positively about their own group, and negatively 
about those out-groups they define as opponents, competitors or enemies’ (van 
Dijk 2011, 397).
When conducting social media analysis, questions of research ethics should 
be considered. It therefore is feasible to review such questions as far as they 
are relevant for the study presented in this work. Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce and 
Taylor (2012), in their textbook Ethnography and Virtual Worlds: A Handbook 
of Methods, argue for an ethics of care position in virtual world research that 
focuses on obtaining informed consent, avoiding harm, providing benefits to 
study participants, and so on. The online world has moved on from virtual 
worlds, such as Second Life and World of Warcraft, to social media, such as 
Facebook and Twitter that are now far more popular. So, we today need an In-
ternet ethics focusing on social media that takes the complex relation between 
public and private on these sites into account.
Janet Salmons (2016), in her textbook Doing Qualitative Research Online, dis-
tinguishes extant, elicited and enacted online research methods. Extant meth-
ods study existing online materials created independently of the researcher’s 
influence. Elicited methods study data that participants elicit in response to 
the researcher’s questions. Enacted methods study data that researchers gener-
ate with participants in a study. Each type would have specific ethical require-
ments. There are different ethical traditions and theories. They have different 
implications for online research (59–68): deontology focuses on ethical rules 
and guidelines (such as the guidelines of the Association for Internet Research-
ers). Consequentialism focuses on research outcomes. Virtue ethics focuses on 
the researcher’s self-defined moral principles. The ethics of care give attention 
to participants’ preferences. Salmons argues for finding a synthesis between 
such positions in online research. Online platforms are public or private to 
varying degrees. Salmons identifies a continuum ranging from public online 
environments that are openly accessible without barriers to private online envi-
ronments that only provide access by permission. She argues that many ethical 
guidelines do not require informed consent for collecting data from public on-
line platforms when the researcher does not influence the creation of the data 
(85–86). Hewson, Vogel and Laurent (2016, 111), in their textbook Internet Re-
search Methods, argue that public online data is ‘perhaps the least contentious 
in terms of being clearly in the public domain, and thus arguably available for 
the use as research data’ without obtaining informed consent.
The British Psychological Society (BPS) argues in its Code of Ethics and Con-
duct that online observation should only take place when and where users 
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‘reasonably expect to be observed by strangers’ (BPS 2009, 13). In its Ethics 
Guidelines for Internet-Mediated Research, the BPS (2013, 6) stresses the blur-
ring between public and private space on the Internet, which complicates re-
search ethics. ‘Where it is reasonable to argue that there is likely no perception 
and/or expectation of privacy (or where scientific/social value and/or research 
validity considerations are deemed to justify undisclosed observation), use of 
research data without gaining valid consent may be justifiable’ (BPS 2013, 7).
The Facebook pages of Norbert Hofer and Heinz Christian Strache are pub-
lic pages. All postings and comments on them are visible to everyone visiting 
them, not just to those who like them. One does not have to have a Facebook 
profile to access the two pages. They can also be viewed without logging into 
Facebook. All postings and all comments are visible in public. Furthermore, 
politicians are public figures. Citizens expect them to stand in and be present 
in the public. This includes the expectation that on social media they post in 
public and offer possibilities for public communication on their profiles. Given 
the public character of Strache and Hofer’s Facebook pages, it is reasonable 
to assume that someone posting a comment on such a page can expect to be 
observed by strangers. In such a case, one does not have to obtain informed 
consent for analysing and quoting such comments. Given that the users are not 
public figures themselves, but only make public comments when posting on a 
politician’s public Facebook page, I do not mention the usernames in the analy-
sis. Netvizz does not save the usernames so that the collected dataset does not 
contain any identifiers. The original comments were posted in German. In this 
article, I only provide English translations of quotes, not the German originals.
8.6. Analysis and Interpretation
In figures 1–15 in the appendix I show the postings by Strache and Hofer se-
lected as data sources for the empirical analysis. I also present translations of 
these postings’ text. In their Facebook postings, Strache and Hofer try to pre-
sent the FPÖ as a reliable and responsible centre party that represents, takes 
care of and defends Austrian interests. They emotionalize the relationship of 
Hofer and the Austrians by calling him the ‘President of Hearts’. This formula-
tion implies that Hofer is a true patriot who loves Austria. The implication is 
that Alexander Van der Bellen is unpatriotic. The FPÖ’s patriotic love to Austria 
is also expressed by formulations such as ‘our homeland Austria and its people!’ 
(‘We are committed to our homeland Austria and its people!’) or ‘our Austria’ 
(‘We will in any case continue to take care of our Austria’). Thus, one of the 
rhetorical strategies is the emotionalisation of Austrian nationalism. Austria 
is presented is a homogeneous national collective that is under threat. Strache 
and Hofer identify a negative outside for constructing a nationalistic identity.
Many of these postings contain links to online articles published in newspa-
pers (oe24.at, krone.at, diepresse.com) and blogs (unzensuriert.at). This fact is 
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a manifestation of the intertextuality of online discourse: Discourses are not 
contained in themselves, but they take networked forms. In the online world, 
this means that news media refer to the comments and social media profiles of 
politicians, whereas politicians link to articles that mention them favourably or 
attack those that are critical of them. The media have played a particular role 
in the making of Jörg Haider, HC Strache and Norbert Hofer. By engaging in 
helping to perform the right-wing populist spectacle, they hope to gain a larger 
number of users, readers, viewers and listeners. unzensuriert.at is a blog that 
has gained particular interest among supporters of Austria’s far-right. The me-
dia company 1848 Medienvielfalt (1848 Media Plurality) published it. Its man-
aging director Walter Asperl worked for FPÖ MP Martin Graf, while the latter 
was deputy speaker in the Austrian Parliament. Chief Editor Alexander Höferl 
was Graf ’s press officer. Unzensuriert understands itself as being ‘committed to 
the truth’ and as fostering media plurality. It also operates a YouTube channel 
that in August 2016 had around 11,000 subscribers, a Facebook page (around 
47,000 likes in August 2016), and a Twitter account. It makes use of a multitude 
of popular social media formats, in which the FPÖ, Strache and Hofer are very 
frequently the main topics. Far-right social media presences, the sensationalist 
press and the FPÖ stand in a mutually beneficial relationship.
This perceived threat to Austria is characterized as consisting of social demo-
crats, the Green Party’s presidential candidate Alexander Van der Bellen, the 
Ministry of the Interior, the European Union (in the form of the President of 
the European Parliament Martin Schulz and the President of the European 
Commission Jean-Claude Juncker), and the Austrian government. Nationalism 
is not just constructed by positive self-presentation, but also by negative other-
presentation: It works by saying that others have insulted the FPÖ and have 
characterized the party as far-right, that they divide the country and play with 
fire, that there were abnormalities, malpractices and illegalities in the counting 
of the votes in the presidential election, that foreigners try to lecture Austrians, 
and that there is the destruction of Austria and the centralisation of power. The 
net effect is the attempt to create the impression that Austria is under attack by 
a union of foreign powers and Left-leaning politicians. 
8.6.1. The First Discourse Topic: Charismatic Leadership
In the dataset, a first discourse strategy focused on constructing an in-group of 
Hofer and Strache supporters by mentioning positive aspects of both politicians 
and presenting the two politicians as charismatic leaders. Here are some examples:
‘7 of 9 federal states have voted for Norbert Hofer. He is the President 
of Hearts’ (#1098)
‘I find Mr Hofer and Mr Strache very sympathetic and highly compe-
tent’ (#2514)
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‘An extraordinarily sympathetic person. […] His statements are com-
municated in a very comprehensive manner to people who have not 
studied’ (#5948)
‘Dear Mr Hofer, You can express yourself very elegantly and you are a 
comforting person’ (#5988)
‘You [Norbert Hofer] are a man of character and it is to wish that you 
become our real President of Hearts’ (#5196)
‘Mr Hofer is a very impressive personality. Thank you that you stood 
as candidate for Austria’ (#5493)
‘I am proud of politicians like you and it makes hope that not-yet eve-
rything is lost in our country as long as we have such great, charismatic, 
honest politicians’ (#5879)
These comments have in common that they emotionalize and personalize 
Hofer and Strache. The commenters do not assess politicians based on their 
ideas, but on subjective impressions of their personality and the way they pre-
sent themselves. The attributes of being sympathetic, competent, comforting, 
charismatic, honest, and having a good character create positive emotional 
attachments. Hofer presents himself in public as calm, sympathetic and – for a 
politician – as relatively young. Personalisation and emotionalisation was part 
of his electoral campaign. The comments indicate that such emotional poli-
tics seem to work among the followers of the FPÖ. The image of Hofer as the 
President of Hearts goes one step further: it tries to politically utilize feelings of 
love. Both Strache and Hofer used these politics of love in Facebook postings 
(see figures 2 and 12). Users positively reacted to this discourse topic and called 
Hofer their President of Hearts. This image not just expresses voters’ admira-
tion for Hofer, but also has a nationalist subtext: it expresses that Hofer loves 
Austria because of his scepticism of immigration and refugees.
The idealisation of Strache and Hofer is also based on the longing for strong 
leadership figures. The justification of the leadership ideology ‘is charismatic: 
it rests on the assertion that the Leader is endowed with qualities lacking in 
ordinary mortals. Superhuman qualities emanate from him and pervade the 
state, party, and people’ (Neumann 2009, 85). FPÖ supporters in the analysed 
comments tended to construct Strache and Haider as superhuman leaders.
A somatisation is ‘the linguistic construction of social actors by synecdochis-
ingly picking out a part or characteristic of their body’ (Reisigl and Wodak 
2001, 53). On the one hand, users in the dataset used gerontonyms for charac-
terising Hofer: they argued that it is refreshing that he looks relatively young for 
a politician. On the other hand, they also used general positive somatisations, 
characterising Hofer as good looking:
‘One enjoys listening to him and he moreover looks so well-groomed’ 
(#5948)
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‘Oh yes, and when someone looks good, then this is even better… 
Beautiful people have it easier than ugly ones… ;-)) See Van der Bellen 
for example ;-((‘ (#5867)
‘You two [Strache and Hofer] not just have a great party, but also look 
damn good’ (#5124)
The second example shows that somatisations tend to be used ideologically for 
defining a bodily difference between the in-group and the out-group. The char-
acterisation of beauty comes along with a repressive definition of an outsider 
as ugly. In this case, Hofer is characterized as beautiful and Van der Bellen 
as ugly. This is a personalisation that implies that one should vote for those 
characterized as beautiful and not for those who are presented as being ugly. 
Personalisation reduces politics to simple bodily, psychological, emotional and 
other subjective features of individuals. It empties out political issues from poli-
tics and results in superficial discourses focused on lifestyles, gossips, scandals, 
sensationalism, and celebrification.
Jörg Haider strongly advanced emotionalization, personalization and 
subjectification as strategies of populist politics in Austria. He appeared as 
‘fashionable, trendy, and entertaining’ (Gingrich 2002, 68). This included in-
formality, events, jokes, music; visits to discos, clubs, beer tents and Sunday 
morning pints (the so-called Frühschoppen); the staging of Haider as sports-
man; or the use of different traditional, fashionable, stylish or casual fashion 
outfits for the right occasions. ‘Almost everyone finds popular entertainment, 
fun, leisure time, sports, relaxation, and dancing to be normal and sympa-
thetic, and a politician who conspicuously and effectively emphasizes such 
activities looks more like a normal family man than do those others who 
constantly talk about complicated political, economic, and social matters. 
Emphasizing the average, the normal, and the popular thus is Haider’s ac-
cess route through mass culture to mainstream voters’ (Gingrich 2002, 74). 
Right-wing populists tend to make use of celebrity culture and the personalisa-
tion and commodification of politics: they ‘oscillate between self-presentations 
as Robin Hood (i.e. saviour of ‘the man and woman in the street’) and self-pres-
entations as ‘rich, famous and/or attractive’ (i.e. an ‘idol’), frequently leading 
to a ‘softer’ image’ (Wodak 2013, 28). Strache and Hofer in many respects copy 
Haider’s strategies of the personalisation and commodification of politics. They 
continue the Haiderisation of politics (Wodak 2013).
Other comments personalized politics by arguing that Hofer and Strache 
were symbols of Austrian national unity:
‘Mr Strache, Mr Hofer. You two are Austria’s guardian angels’ (#94)
‘Yes to Austria and yes to our protector Norbert Hofer. That’s the only 
way it can work’ (#203)
‘Hofer is at least a real Austrian name. :-)’ (#1804)
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‘Our president [Hofer] who stands for us Austrians’ (#6083).
‘Norbert Hofer!!!! Austria again and again’ (#6144)
‘Dear HC Strache. To be totally honest!!! You from the FPÖ are the 
only hope for our beloved homeland Austria!! Please continue this 
way and keep a very very strict eye on these traitors to the country and 
the people!!! I wish you all the best on your way forward!!! Comradely 
greetings from a convinced Austrian patriot!!! ;-)’ (#3422)
These users argue that Hofer has a German name, represents Austria and that 
the FPÖ stands for the love of the homeland and patriotism. The use of linguo-
nyms (German family name) and nationyms (nation, homeland, and so on) 
serves the purpose of describing Austria as a German-speaking cultural nation 
that should be kept free from immigrants and refugees. Hofer and Strache are 
seen as the symbols of Austrian nationalism. The reference to Hofer as a ‘real 
Austrian name’ is an indirect reference to the fact that Van der Bellen is a Dutch 
name and that Alexander Van der Bellen’s ancestors lived in Russia and  Estonia. 
His parents emigrated from Estonia to Austria. The implication of such argu-
ments is that a presidential candidate who was not born in Austria cannot 
represent Austrian interests and is likely to be immigration-friendly. It is the 
call that Austrians should prefer xenophobic, racist and nationalist politicians. 
‘Austria again and again’ is a reference to a popular chant of Austrian foot-
ball fans at matches of the Austrian national team.5 ‘Immer wieder Österreich’ 
(Austria all over again) is also the title an election song that the FPÖ used in the 
2015 Vienna local elections.6 The description of Strache and Hofer as Austria’s 
guardian angels, of Hofer as protector and as representing ‘us Austrians’ is an 
expression of the ideological belief in a strong leader who protects the Austrian 
nation from immigrants and other perceived enemies.
8.6.2. The Second Discourse Topic: Austrian Nationalism
A second discourse topic was Austrian nationalism. It varies from the first in that it 
did not identify individual leaders as symbols of Austrian nationalism, but spoke 
about the importance of unifying the Austrian nation in more general terms.
‘But also we are compelled to advocate our homeland and care for a bet-
ter future’ (#20)
‘Austria must be preserved for us as Austrians’ (#3526)
‘Austria first’ (#4010)
‘Love for the home country is not a crime!!! But to watch how Austria 
is becoming destroyed is one…’ (#5318)
Karl Marx (1867) introduced the concept of commodity fetishism. He describes 
the commodity as a ‘strange’ (163), ‘metaphysical’ (163), ‘mystical’ (164), and 
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‘mysterious’ (164) entity that ‘transcends sensuousness’ (163). The commod-
ity ‘stands on its head’ so that odd ideas about the nature of the commodity 
can emerge. As a consequence, the social relations between humans appear 
not ‘as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as 
material relations between persons and social relations between things’ (166). 
‘ Grotesque ideas’ (163) that naturalize forms of domination and exploitation 
are the result. Fetishistic thought is not limited to the economy, where the com-
modity, class, money, capital, and so on appear as natural, but also extends to 
the political world.
Nationalism is a form of political fetishism that presents a constructed na-
tional community as unitary, naturally grown, necessary, superior, and mytho-
logical by focusing on stressing a common culture, history, language, ethnicity, 
territory, and so on. It tries to deflect attention from how class relations and 
power inequalities shape society. Nationalism tries ‘through a mythology of 
unity and identity, to project a ‘common instinctual fate’ (uniform social status) 
between bourgeois and proletarianized groups, eliding the reality of social dis-
tinction in differentiated class societies’ (Woodley 2010, 17). Nationalism is an 
ideology that a) ‘divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘friends’ and ‘foes’, posit-
ing a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side and stressing the char-
acteristics that differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’’ (Özkirimli 2010, 208), b) makes 
temporal claims to an authentic connection of national citizens and their com-
mon past, as well as c) spatial claims to territory in the form of ‘the quest for a 
“home’’’ (Özkirimli 2010, 209).
In 1993, the FPÖ conducted an anti-immigration referendum that was 
signed by 7.35% of Austria’s eligible voters. The referendum’s title was ‘Austria 
first’. One of its demands was to add a clause to the Austrian constitution stating 
that ‘Austria is not a country of immigration’. In 2009, HC Strache published a 
rap song titled ‘Austria first’ (Österreich zuerst). In 2011, the FPÖ titled its of-
ficial party programme ‘Austria First’ (FPÖ 2011).
Many comments in the analysed dataset propagate Austrian nationalism. 
They argue that Austria as a homeland should come first and that it faces the 
threat to be destroyed by immigrants and refugees. The implication is that 
Austria must be defended against foreign influences and should be a unitary 
cultural nation. Austrian nationalism constructs the Austrian nation as a ho-
mogeneous unit of Austrian-born German-speaking individuals who form a 
national bond by history, language, traditions, and culture. It sees this unity 
under attack by immigration, refugees and transnational institutions such as 
the EU. The consequence of this ideology is a call to defend the Austrian nation. 
Austrian national unity is just like all nationalism: a pure ideological construc-
tion. The dialects spoken in Burgenland and Vorarlberg, the easternmost and 
westernmost Austrian federal states, are so different that citizens living in the 
two regions often have to resort to standard German in order to understand 
each other. Burgenland was part of Hungary from 1648 to 1921 and only be-
came part of Austria in 1921. Hence the joint history of contemporary Austria 
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is historically fairly recent. Gruber is the most common German family name 
in Austria.7 In 2016, there were 915 entries for this surname in Vienna’s tel-
ephone book.8 Nowak is a very common Czech name. In 2016, there were 301 
entries for it in Vienna’s phone directory.9 The prevalence of both German and 
non-German family names shows Austria’s multicultural nature: many Aus-
trian families have immigrant roots that date back to an earlier generation.
8.6.3. The Third Discourse Topic: The Friend-Enemy Scheme
In ideologies, positive self-presentation of the in-group is often accompanied 
by negative other-presentation of the out-group. In far-right ideology, the out-
group is often presented as the enemy who threatens the in-group and should 
therefore be controlled, excluded or removed. The ‘friend-enemy distinction 
implied by Manichean demonization […] plays a fundamental role in codify-
ing enmity’ (Woodley 2010, 9). Manicheanism is a highly polarising worldview 
that sees the world as constituted by opposing good and evil forces. A third 
discourse topic found in the analysed comments was a Manichean worldview 
that used the friend-enemy scheme for constructing a hostile out-group. Van der 
Bellen was presented as the leader of the out-group and as its most despicable 
representative.
Some referred to Van der Bellen as ‘Woof-Woof ’ (Wau-Wau):
‘We want Norbert Hofer as president and not the Woof-Woof ’ (#338)
‘Now the Woof-Woof is the leader of the red-green mafia’ (#333)
Such statements are a vilification of Van der Bellen’s name, playing with the fact 
that ‘bellen’ means to bark in German. Linguistic animalisation and biologisa-
tion is a typical semiotic strategy in far-right ideology. The aim is to dehuman-
ize the enemy and to present him/her as a lower type of being.
Van der Bellen was also presented as being a communist and dictator:
‘But let us now be glad and happy that Mr VdB saves us as communist – 
because communism has of course only always done the best for the 
people’ (#564)
‘VdB is de-facto the 2nd [Austrian] republic’s first dictator, a flawless 
anti-democrat!!!’ (#1147)
‘Also Stalin ignored the people – Isn’t Bello also a communist, right?’ 
(#1623)
‘A dictator, but one would not have expected anything else from this 
green liar’ (#1742)
‘The Austrian Stalin’ (#2237)
‘Joseph Stalin and Tito look down to us. You have found a worthy suc-
cessor in the People’s Republic of Austria under the leader VdB’ (#1846)
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A common comment of FPÖ supporters on Facebook was that they described 
Van der Bellen as a dictator comparable to Stalin and Tito. By calling Van der 
Bellen a communist, such users alluded to the fact that at the age of twenty Van 
der Bellen had once voted for the Austrian Communist Party KPÖ. The use of 
strongly emotionally connoted politonyms such as ‘communist’ and ‘dictator’ 
aims at communicating political danger and presenting the enemy as dangerous.
Most of these postings refer to Alexander Van der Bellen’s declaration that as 
Austrian President he would not provide a mandate to the FPÖ to form a gov-
ernment if the party were the relatively strongest force after elections. On 24 May 
2018 the German public service broadcasting channel ARD interviewed Van 
der Bellen, who said in the news programme Tagesthemen: ‘My concerns are 
not of a personal nature. I have always stressed this fact. They are a matter of 
European politics because the FPÖ so to speak plays in various suggestions 
with fire. It flirts with the re-nationalisation of the European Union’.10 In an-
other interview, Van der Bellen also commented on this issue: ‘We are not in 
favour of the world’s LePens governing us’.11 In Van der Bellen’s view, the FPÖ 
spreads nationalism and xenophobia. His fear is that it has an anti-democratic 
agenda. This is the reason why he argues against a FPÖ mandate to form the 
Austrian government. Strache, in one of his Facebook postings (see figure 5), 
inverted this logic and asked: ‘Who splits the country and plays with fire?’ He 
thereby implied that not the FPÖ, but Van der Bellen advanced a dangerous 
form of politics.
Article 70 of the Austrian Federal Constitution regulates that the ‘Chancellor 
and on his/her recommendation the other members of the federal government 
are appointed by the President’.12 It does not provide regulations, to which party 
leader the President gives the mandate to form a government. That the Aus-
trian President chooses not to provide such a mandate to the strongest party 
after election because s/he is afraid there are anti-democratic tendencies in this 
party is within the democratic merit of the Austrian constitution. It is by no 
means anti-democratic or dictatorial. To argue that Van der Bellen is anti-dem-
ocratic ideologically inverts and distorts political reality.
Other commenters used the somatisation of Van der Bellen as dirty and ill to 
characterise him:
Who splits the country and plays with fire? A good question that can be 
answered quickly: The grotty and geriatric ’68 generation (#1886)
The old, dishevelled man (#1991)
This train station vagabond should go and shit himself (#2188)
Unshaved, shabby trench tramp (#2189)
Allegedly the old one has cancer from smoking (#6356)
In 2016, Van der Bellen was 72 years old and Norbert Hofer 45. Descriptions of 
Van der Bellen as old, shabby, unshaved, ill, dishevelled or grotty are aimed at 
setting up a dichotomy that delegitimizes Van der Bellen and legitimizes Hofer 
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by references to bodily appearance and health. Right-wing ideology often codes 
the Us/Them distinction inherent in the friend-enemy scheme as a series of 
dualisms: on the one side we find something on the inside that is presented 
as modern, popular, entertaining, colourful, young, attractive, ordinary, good-
looking, or healthy. On the other side, the opposition is presented as outdated, 
timid, boring, unappealing, old, unattractive, withdrawn, dirty, or ill.
Other enemies mentioned in comments were the European Union, mass 
media like the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation, social democrats, Greens, 
migrants, and Islam:
[EU Commission President] Juncker must go!!! The Brussels terrorists 
(#3640)
Hopefully this pigsty EU decays soon! (#3659)
The lying press says the FPÖ is the problem and not mass immigra-
tion, criminality, Islamisation, the EU, the ECB [European Central 
Bank], bureaucratisation, the loss of prosperity, and so on. That’s also 
how the GDR [German Democratic Republic] ended, and the red-
green-black [= alliance of Social Democrats-Greens-Conservatives] 
dictatorship will end exactly the same way! (#4145)
The aggressive ORF moderator [Lou Lorenz-Dittlbacher, who con-
ducted a critical TV interview with Strache] is annoying – just like the 
whole contaminated ORF! [Austrian Broadcasting Corporation = Aus-
tria’s public service broadcaster] Somehow understandable, they all fear 
for their jobs. If the FPÖ had to decide on that: No compulsory licence 
fees any longer Æ No ORF any longer. Sometime it will happen (#4279)
Jean-Claude Juncker congratulated Van der Bellen on his (preliminary) vic-
tory. The President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, said that this 
preliminary win was a ‘defeat of Eurosceptics’13. In the analysed dataset, FPÖ 
supporters reacted in a very Manichean and defensive manner to any criti-
cism of Hofer, Strache or the FPÖ. They presented themselves as victims of a 
conspiracy instigated by a union of green, social democratic and conservative 
politicians, the media, the EU, immigrants and refugees, communists, Freema-
sonry, and so on. They perceive themselves and the FPÖ to be under constant 
attack, and construct themselves as victims – which disregards that it is the 
FPÖ and its followers who tend to construct scapegoats, especially migrants, 
refugees and Islam. The perceived association of enemies is verbally attacked 
by the use of strong political categories (terrorism, dictatorship, and so on) on 
the one hand, and biologistic language (pigsty, contamination, and so on) on 
the other hand.
It is not a surprise that one of the identified enemies is the EU. The FPÖ 
already under Jörg Haider turned into a Eurosceptic party. Haider for example 
wrote in 1993: ‘If this Europe is not to be a cultural and linguistic pabulum 
coming from the Brussels bureaucrats’ meat chopper, then the development 
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into a Europe of peoples and ethnic groups must be enabled’ (cited in: Bailer-
Galanda and Neugebauer 1997, 192). In 1996, he said: ‘But our idea of Europe 
is not a pabulum in Brussels, but our idea is a Europe of home countries’ (cited 
in: Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 1997, 193). The FPÖ’s (2011) Party Pro-
gramme is committed to a ‘Europe of free peoples and fatherlands’. It spells out 
that the EU is questioned because it is seen as a danger to nationalism. ‘We are 
committed to a Europe of peoples and autochthonous groups of people which 
have developed through history, and firmly reject any artificial synchronisation 
of the diverse European languages and cultures by means of forced multicul-
turalism, globalization and mass immigration. Europe shall not be reduced to 
a political project of the European Union’ (FPÖ 2011). Austrian nationalism 
that puts ‘Austria first’ was also evident in the analysed comments. Euroscepti-
cism was very present. Hofer argues for an Austrian referendum on leaving the 
EU (Öxit, Auxit) in case of ‘Turkey joining – but also if the EU becomes more 
centralistic’.14
8.6.4. The Fourth Discourse Topic: New Racism
A fourth discourse topic found in the dataset was new racism and xenophobia. 
It is closely related to the friend-enemy scheme. Immigrants and refugees were 
seen as the main threat to the Austrian nation.
‘For the FPÖ, the Austrian to whom this country belongs first, also 
when refugees are on the way the Austrian MUST come first!’ (#3964)
‘The SPÖ and its friends have destroyed, estranged and islamised 
our country!’ (#4144)
‘Please do something before Islam swamps us !!!!!!!!’ (#119)
‘They [those not born in Austria] do not have our roots, not our 
religion’ (#205)
‘Austria must first look for its own citizens, in respect to jobs, that 
they are motivated and have a meaningful life. Only then can we think 
of asylum seekers!!’ (#6457)
‘What are the SPÖ [Social Democratic Party of Austria] and the 
Greens? In my view they are hostile towards native citizens [inländer-
feindlich]…. Because they allow the mass immigration of criminals…. 
Rapists, killers etc… Where will this end?’ (#584)
‘I do not want that we in Austria give shelter to even more ‘refugees’ 
that are none, on a mandatory basis every year, are you still normal at 
all? Who wants that, not me and also not 50%!’ (#2585)
‘I feel sorry for people who for example live in Traiskirchen [Aus-
trian town with the country’s largest refugee camp] or parents in Vienna, 
Salzburg or Linz, whose children commute to school per train, subway 
or bus day by day. They live in the daily fear whether their children get 
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home safely […] For me, our own country is important, the future as 
well as safeguards for my children […] I am a realist and patriot who 
loves his country and its population!!!’ (#5307).
‘The country needs other politicians. Austrians first. These politics 
suck. Foreigners receive more than we taxpayers’ (#64)
‘We do not need even more asylum seekers in our beautiful Austria 
because we have enough of our own people who are in need of help. In 
my opinion one first and foremost has to do something for us Austrians 
before we always throw money at others’ (#5916)
Whereas nationalism defines an illusionary inside of a national community, 
new racism is a repressive politics that defines and struggles against the per-
ceived outside and makes use of racialising ideological practices for defend-
ing the inside/outside differentiation with violent means. The defence of 
boundaries takes place not just outside, but also inside a nation state. ‘Racism 
is constantly emerging out of nationalism, not only towards the exterior but 
towards the interior’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 53). New racism operates 
‘by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries between racially constituted 
categories, and its typically binary system of representation constantly marks 
and attempts to fix and naturalize the difference between belongingness and 
otherness’ (Hall 1989/1996, 445). The out-group is often presented in the form 
of stereotypes that reduce, essentialize, naturalize, and fix the power differences 
between the in-group and the out-group (Hall 1997, 258). New racism justifies 
the exploitation, exclusion, domination, or annihilation of an out-group. One 
can draw a ‘distinction between a racism of extermination or elimination (an 
“exclusive” racism) and a racism of oppression or exploitation (an “inclusive” 
racism)’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 39).
The new racism present in the cited comments makes use of a number of 
classical stereotypes that can be summarized in the following statements (see 
Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 55):
tCultural stereotypes: ‘There are already too many foreigners here and more 
immigrants and refugees in the country overforeignize our culture and so-
ciety. Foreigners have a different culture, religion and lifestyle that does not 
belong into our country’
tEconomic stereotypes: ‘Foreigners take away Austrians’ jobs and dump 
wages’
tCriminal stereotypes: ‘Foreigners are criminals, violent and aggressive’
tWelfare stereotypes: ‘Foreigners cost lots of money that we need for our 
own people. They are socio-parasites who get more out of the welfare and 
tax system than they pay in’
tGender stereotypes: ‘Foreigners are sexists and rapists. They have an inher-
ently repressive patriarchal attitude towards women’
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The new racism immanent in the discussed statements constructs Austrians as an 
in-group, who are under attack by foreigners as an out-group who come to Aus-
tria as immigrants and refugees. It aims at defending a pure Austrian nation from 
foreign influences and implicitly argues that only Austrian-born, white, German-
speaking Roman-Catholics should be allowed to live in the country. Foreigners 
are presented as an alien social and cultural out-group that threatens Austria’s 
culture (language, customs, habits, religion, lifestyle), economy (jobs, wages) and 
social system (crime and violence, welfare, gender relations). The statements im-
ply an exclusive new racism, i.e. that foreigners should have to leave the country.
8.6.5. The Fifth Discourse Topic: Violence
The fifth discourse topic present in the dataset is a radicalisation of the friend/
enemy- scheme: the threat or wish to use violence against the perceived enemies.
‘Only a rebellion of patriots would now help and EVERYONE JOINS 
IN!’ (#3163)
‘If the EU violently imposes penalties on differing opinions, then this 
is clearly dictatorship and that’s something the majority will not accept. 
There will then be uprisings and demonstrations with more or less out-
bursts of violence’ (#167).
‘The time will come where they all fall into the pit… AND WE WILL 
THEN FILL UP THE PIT!!!!!’ (#5862)
[Users about the Austrian writer Robert Menasse’s voiced opinion that 
Strache is a Nazi and a local SPÖ-politician’s support for Menasse’s state-
ment]:
‘Such people should be immediately imprisoned’ (#894)
‘I would immediately revoke the Austrian citizenship of SPÖ-local 
party secretary Reinhard Kadlec and Mr Robert Menasse’ (#656)
‘They all together belong into an internment camp because they are a 
danger to all citizens’ (#742)
‘For this statement, he deserves to have his face smashed in’ (#571) 
‘Aha, this pinko should be blown away’ (#1426)
[About Alexander Van der Bellen]:
‘If the FPÖ would indeed achieve the majority of the votes and Bello 
carries out this threat, then he should be chased out of office with a wet 
shred’ (#1913) ‘My partner is already a bit afraid that I throw the next 
thing into the direction of the TV when I see VdB! I must really restrain 
myself because this morning I answered to the greetings of a Romanian 
who lives in my house by saying ‘Go and shit yourself ’…’ (#3880)
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‘And then people wonder if the cold lust to kill comes up in a decent 
Hofer-voter…’ (#1945)
[About the journalist Lou Lorenz-Dittlbacher, who conducted a critical 
interview with Strache]:
‘I would have landed the OBNOXIOUS Dittlbacher one in the face. She 
is even more disgusting than Thurnher [=another ORF television jour-
nalist]’ (#4571)
Some of the comments demanded demonstrations, a rebellion and uprisings 
in light of Van der Bellen’s preliminary victory in the May 2016 Austrian presi-
dential election. Civil society protests are mostly peaceful, and it is politically 
dangerous to frame them in the context of violence. There were, however, also 
comments that explicitly demanded demonstrations with ‘outbursts of vio-
lence’. Far-right ideology tends to argue for a strong state that enforces law-
and-order politics. Some commenters demanded a totalitarian state that limits 
freedom of speech by imprisoning, interning and stripping citizenship rights 
from political opponents of the FPÖ. There were calls to chase Van der Bellen 
out of office and to kill him. There were calls for physical violence against politi-
cians, writers and journalists. Acts of violence mentioned as means that should 
be directed at identified enemies included hitting, shooting, and general killing.
Such comments display the inherent violent potentials of far-right ideology. 
The ideological definition of a unitary nation as in-group and enemy out-groups 
polarizes political relations. Stereotypes aim at ideologically dehumanising the 
out-groups and at fostering the in-group’s aggression and hatred towards the 
constructed enemies. Right-wing extremism tends to use a ‘violent linguistic 
rhetoric’, advance the ‘damaging of the political opponent’, and has an inherent 
‘linguistic latency of aggression and defamation’ (Holzer 1993, 65). Constant 
far-right demagoguery against humanists, immigrants, refugees, socialists, and 
so on can lower the inhibition threshold of citizens who are prone to such ideol-
ogy and can condition them to voice violent threats against perceived enemies 
or engage in physical attacks, anonymous online or offline threats, and so on.
The German legal theorist Carl Schmitt, who was associated with Nazism, 
introduced the friend-enemy scheme in his book The Concept of the Political. 
‘The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can 
be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ (Schmitt 1932/1996, 26). War 
and physical killing are for Schmitt inherent aspects of the very concept of the 
enemy: ‘For to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of com-
bat […] The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning 
precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War fol-
lows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy. It is the most 
extreme consequence of enmity’ (32–33).
The friend-enemy scheme was at the heart of Nazi fascism. Nazism conceived 
the Germans as a superior race that needs to form a nation and rid itself of what 
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it considered to be its enemies, especially Jews, socialists, the working-class 
movements and communists. Hitler called for the annihilation of Nazism’s en-
emies. ‘If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should suc-
ceed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will 
not be the bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the 
annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe, for the time when the non-Jewish 
nations had no propaganda is at an end’ (Hitler 1939). A society based on mass 
extermination is the most devastating potential consequence of nationalism 
and fascism. Far-right ideology does not see social problems as the result of 
structural power inequalities and contradictions of society; instead it person-
alizes them and inscribes them biologically and/or culturally into individuals 
and groups. It alleges that specific naturalized and essentialized characteristics 
belong to conceived enemy groups. Fetishistic thought can lead to violence, 
and in the final instance to fascism, Nazism and politics of mass annihilation.
8.7. Conclusion
The historian Willibald Holzer (1993) lists the following characteristics of 
right-wing extremism:
tStress on the existence and importance of a national community;
tExclusion of the foreign; Social Darwinism; ethnocentrism; ethnic separa-
tism;
tAuthoritarianism, anti-pluralism, opposition to democracy;
tAnti-socialism; focus on competition and performance;
tAuthoritarian state;
tScapegoating;
tOrientation to traditions; apologetic concept of history;
tA political style that features demagogy and acceptance of violence.
The core of right-wing extremism can be summarized as consisting in the 
principles of 1) authoritarian populism guided by the leadership principle, 
2)  nationalism, 3) the friend-enemy scheme, and 4) militarism (Fuchs 2017, 
2018a). This chapter analysed how voters of Norbert Hofer expressed their 
 support on Facebook. The analysis showed that all key elements of right-wing 
extremism could be found in online comments.
The leadership principle online was expressed as admiration for Hofer and 
Strache. Both were seen as charismatic leaders, to whom voters have an emo-
tional relationship. Supporters projected Austrian nationalism into the image 
of superhuman leaders. Hofer was described as sympathetic, young and good-
looking, which reduced politics to personalisation. Austrian nationalism was 
expressed online through arguments claiming that a unitary Austrian nation 
consisting of a homogeneous Austrian-born linguistic and cultural community 
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exists and is under threat by immigration, refugees, socialists, communists, 
Greens, critical media and transnational institutions such as the EU.
The friend-enemy scheme online could be found in the analysed dataset in 
the form of Manichean views of and hatred spread against the Green Party pres-
idential candidate Alexander Van der Bellen, journalists, the European Union, 
the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation ORF, migrants, refugees, Islam, social 
democrats and the Green party. Van der Bellen was characterized as dictator, 
communist, animal, dirty, ill, ugly, old, dishevelled and grotty. Immigrants and 
refugees were seen as the main threat to the Austrian nation. Users employed 
cultural, economic, criminal and gender stereotypes. Online militarism was 
present in the form of violent threats to and death wishes for politicians such as 
Alexander Van der Bellen, writers and journalists.
The overall conclusion of my analysis is that right-wing extremist ideology 
was very observable and significant in the comments made on the Facebook 
pages of the leading FPÖ politicians Heinz-Christian Strache and Norbert 
Hofer. Leadership ideology, nationalism, new racism and xenophobia, the 
friend-enemy scheme, and militarism constitute important elements of right-
wing extremism online. On the one hand, demagogues exercise far-right ideol-
ogy ‘from above’. On the other hand, such ideology can only persist through 
hegemony ‘from below’. Social media is instrumental in fostering both right-
wing extremist responses from below and far-right ideology from above. As a 
result of violence propagated online, after the May 2016 presidential election 
Alexander Van der Bellen was put under special police protection. One Face-
book posting had published his private address and called for terrorist attacks 
against him. Figure 8.a shows some examples of online violence in the context 
of the Austrian presidential election.
Answers to the question of how to react to right-wing extremism online are 
not straightforward. Calls for violence should of course always be reported to 
the police. At the same time, the Internet will always provide possibilities for 
anonymity, so there will always be loopholes for militant online fascism. A small 
number of Van der Bellen supporters posted criticism of far-right ideology on 
Strache and Hofer’s Facebook pages. The following are two example comments:
The FPÖ is a ‘nationalist, xenophobic party under the disguise of love 
for the homeland’ (#5619)
‘How violent are you actually? This is simply just brutal! […] And 
express your opinions without death threats. I have heard that now even 
the Cobra [special police unit] must protect Van der Bellen because 
someone made death threats. You create fear. How do you think that he 
now feels? Nobody deserves this’ (#5847)
Hofer and Strache supporters largely ignored such appeals and arguments. 
They did not react to them. In some cases, they voiced threats against Van der 
Bellen supporters:
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1. Vienna will fall first. And then we’ll see further;
2. The chancellery and the Hofburg [office of the Austrian president] ought 
to be stormed, and the parliament be burnt down;
3. Those who voted for van der Belln ought to be burnt on the stake;
4. The Glock 17 [a type of pistol] is loaded and ready to fire;
5. It will surely be a bombastic atmosphere;
6. The weapon is unpacked !
7. Onto the streets in order to run riot;
8. What a shame. One really should take to the streets and bring everything 
to a halt.
Figure 8.a: Examples of online violence in the context of the 2016 Austrian 
presidential election, source: http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/Mord-
Drohung-gegen-Van-der-Bellen/237125974
‘What if once something happens to you, when you are the centre of an 
act of violence, will you then wake up?’ (#4060)
The crisis of capitalism has resulted in an intensification and extension of right-
wing extremism that promises simple xenophobic and new racist solutions to 
social problems. The intensification of online right-wing extremism is a mani-
festation of this tendency. There are no easy fixes to this unsettling reality. Only 
profound social, political, socio-economic, educational and cultural responses 
can ground an effective form of contemporary anti-fascism. Slavoj Žižek (2016, 
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100) argues that what is needed is ‘a positive universal project shared by all par-
ticipants’, a project for the commons that makes different suffering groups see 
that they ‘are parts of one and the same universal struggle’ (101). Such a project 
is commonly called ‘socialism’. Given the inherent connection of capitalism, 
nationalism and new racism, a fundamental change of power relations, the 
economy and politics is needed in order to avoid the possibility of a ‘fascism-
producing crisis’ (Eley 2015, 112).
The reasons for the rise of the FPÖ in Austria are complex and manifold. They 
include an incomplete de-Nazification process, Austrian nationalism, Austrian 
neoliberalism, the role of right-wing media, the institutional containment of 
class struggle, weakness of the political Left, a low level of general education, 
and the patronage system (see Fuchs 2016a for a detailed discussion). The 
FPÖ’s electoral successes are an indication that the ‘“spectre which is haunting 
Europe”, some 60 years after the end of the Third Reich and its national- socialist 
ideology, is the “spectre of radical right-wing populism”’ (Wodak 2013, 24). 
One must certainly add that the spectre of new racism, new nationalism and 
the New Right is articulated with capitalist development and class structures – 
destructive forces that Marx and Engels already criticized when publishing 
the Communist Manifesto in 1848. Right-wing populism combines social is-
sues with nationalism and new racism and pretends to fill the vacuum that has 
been created by social democracy’s move towards embracing neoliberalism and 
shifting itself towards the right in the political spectrum.
New Right populism is ‘the price the Left pays for renouncing any radical 
political project, and accepting market capitalism as “the only game in town’’’ 
(Žižek 2000/2006, 41). ‘The populist Right moves to occupy the terrain evacu-
ated by the Left, as the only “serious” political force that still employs an anti-
capitalist rhetoric – even if thickly coated with a nationalist/racist/religious 
veneer’ (Žižek 2000/2006, 33–34). The only feasible challenge to the right-wing 
populist solution is the re-invention of the Left and the creation of a new social-
ism for the twentieth century. If such a project fails, then we may very well be on 
the path towards a new fascism in Europe and throughout the world. We are to-
day again at the crossroads that Rosa Luxemburg, citing Friedrich Engels, iden-
tified exactly 100 years ago: ‘Bourgeois society stands at the crossroads, either 
transition to socialism or regression into barbarism.’ (Luxemburg 1916, 388).
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Appendix: Hofer and Strache’s Postings on Facebook
Figure 8.1: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 1.
We are committed to our homeland Austria and its people! We continue reli-
ably and consequently on our path! Thank you for your huge support!
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Figure 8.2: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 2.
Norbert Hofer is and remains the President of Hearts! [Image text: President 
of Hearts]
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Figure 8.3: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 3.
That’s just primitive and shabby! [Link to an online article titled ‘SPÖ local 
party secretary derails completely: Voters of Hofer are ‘Nazis, fascists, idiots’’]
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Figure 8.4: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 4.
Such rants are simply primitive, disgraceful and outrageous! Our FPÖ vice-
mayor Michael Schnedlitz (image) has uncovered of a high SPÖ-functionary 
in Wiener Neustadt [Link to an online article titled ‘SPÖ politician designates 
Hofer as a Nazi’]
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Figure 8.5: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 5.
Who splits the country and plays with fire? [Link to an online article titled 
‘ Alexander Van der Bellen plays with fire’]
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Figure 8.6: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 6.
Miraculous augmentation of the postal voting cards by 60.000! Chief election 
administrator MA Stein (from the Federal Ministry of the Interior) comes un-
der significant pressure!
Besides the 5 districts, in which the votes were counted illegally without elec-
tion assessors (the Minister of the Interior filed charges), there was a fabulous 
turnout of 146% in Waidhofen/Ybbs, one double vote thanks to a postal voting 
card (uncovered by a video-blogger), and many other hints and inconsistencies!
Furthermore, there was the questionable projection by the Federal Minis-
try of the Interior that showed 56.5% for Norbert Hofer with 65% of ballots 
counted. Computers usually do not err!
The Federal Ministry of the Interior had published the result of the postal 
votes online at the evening of election Sunday before the postal votes were 
counted on Monday after 9 o’clock. The information was later deleted and 
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dismissed as error and malfunction! Computers usually do not make mistakes, 
only the people who control and operate them do!!!
Mr Stein spoke in a ZIB2-interview [evening news programme on the public 
service broadcasting channel ORF 2] of 740,000 postal votes (a projectionist 
from his ministry spoke of exactly 738,055) that then miraculously and inex-
plicably further increased significantly (even by about 60,000!).
There was an internationally completely unique, questionably high amount 
of invalid ballots among the postal voting cards! And much more!
Full transparency, control and elucidation are now the order of the day! It is 
now a question of democracy and the rule of law! And a question of citizens’ 
trust in this rule of law and its basic democratic rules!
Figure 8.7: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 7.
The Austrians surely have waited for Mr Schulz’s ‘good’ advice to [the Austrian 
Chancellor] Kern [Link to the online article ‘Hofburg election result is ‘a defeat 
of the Euro-sceptics’’] 
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Figure 8.8: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 8.
Juncker is happy to be able to construct a centralistic EU-federal state together 
with Van der Bellen. The truth is that this is about Austria’s abolition. We will 
in any case continue to take care of our Austria! [Link to posting titled ‘Juncker 
painted a heart on the letter of congratulation to Van der Bellen’]
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Figure 8.9: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 9
Every day we hear about the allegedly deep divide in the population!
The cause is not the division of the country and of the people, but the popu-
lation’s loss of confidence in those up there in the government! This is what 
infuriates the Austrian population.
The FPÖ is not the problem (but rather the solution). The problems are the 
SPÖ/ÖVP-government’s dramatic errors and the politics of sustainable harm 
caused to the country. 
196 Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism
Figure 8.10: Heinz Christian Strache’s Facebook posting no. 10.
My interview in yesterday’s ZIB 2:
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Figure 8.11: Norbert Hofer’s Facebook posting no. 1.
[Hofer’s reposting of Strache’s posting no. 1]
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Figure 8.12: Norbert Hofer’s Facebook posting no. 2.
Here is the current issue of the ‘New Free Newspaper’, featuring images of and 
articles on the presidential election [Image text: Norbert Hofer remains the 
‘President of Hearts’]
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Figure 8.13: Norbert Hofer’s Facebook posting no. 3.
The FPÖ is not a right-wing extremist party. If a right-wing extremist party had 
run in Austria, it would have received an election result of maybe two percent. 
The share of fools in Austria is definitely not larger. We are a highly responsible 
centre-right party. [Link to online article titled ‘Hofer: ‘Share of fools in Austria 
is at the most two percent’]
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Figure 8.14: Norbert Hofer’s Facebook posting no. 4.
Here are my statements from yesterday’s joint press conference with HC Strache
Racism, Nationalism and Right-Wing Extremism Online 201
Figure 8.15: Norbert Hofer’s Facebook posting no. 5.
My interview with the ORF [Austrian Broadcasting Corporation] from yesterday 
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Notes
 1 The following list was first elaborated and presented in Fuchs (2018b), from 
where it is reproduced.
 2 „Im Dritten Reich haben sie ordentliche Beschäftigungspolitik gemacht. 
was nicht einmal Ihre Regierung in Wien zusammenbringt" (Protokoll der 
Sitzung des Kärtner Landtags, 13 June 1991).
 3 Original: „Ich habe gesagt, dass ich die Regierung entlasse, wenn die Regierung 
Gesetze bricht, die Verfassung bricht oder immer wieder Maßnahmen setzt, 
die dem Land schaden. Dass dann, um Schaden abzuwenden vom Land, der 
letzte Schritt, die Ultimo Ratio, sein kann, die Regierung zu entlassen”.
 4 Original: „Das würde ja heißen, die Bundesregierung handelt auf Anor-
dnung des Bundespräsidenten. Es ist aber genau umgekehrt: Der Bunde-
spräsident hat auf Vorschläge der Bundesregierung zu achten. Falls Sie 
diesen Stil tatsächlich, falls Sie gewählt werden sollten, […] einschlagen 
sollten, sind wir auf dem Weg in eine autoritäre Republik”
 5 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSg6OkpIacs&feature=youtu.be, 
accessed on 5 July 2016.
 6 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xzyUuRXRQfo, accessed on July 
5, 2016.
 7 http://www.telefonabc.at/haeufigste-nachnamen.aspx, accessed on 8 June 
2016.
 8 http://www.herold.at/telefonbuch, accessed on 8 June 2016.
 9 http://www.herold.at/telefonbuch, accessed on 8 June 2016.
 10 „Meine Bedenken sind nicht persönlicher Art, das habe ich immer betont, 
sondern europapolitischer Art vor allem, weil die FPÖ in verschiedenen 
Andeutungen sozusagen mit dem Feuer spielt, mit der Renationalisierung 
der Europäischen Union liebäugelt” (ARD Tagesthemen, May 24, 2016).
 11 „Wir sind doch nicht dafür, dass die Le Pens dieser Welt uns regieren” (Die 
Presse, 18 May 2016).
 12 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz: German version, accessed on https://www.ris.
bka.gv.at (6 July 2016).
 13 Schulz-Kern-Treffen: Hofburg-Ergebnis „Niederlage für Euro-Skeptiker”. 
Kronen Zeitung, 27 May 2016.
 14 http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20160702_OTS0027/hofer-in-
oesterreich-eu-austrittsreferendum-wenn-eu-zentralistischer-wird, accessed 
on 6 July 2016.
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